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NOTES
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A DEFENSE FOR
A NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of assumption of risk is a judically created
rule which was developed in response to the general impulse
of the common-law courts during the eighteenth century in
England. Its purpose was "to insulate the employer as much
as possible from bearing the 'human overhead' which is an
inevitable part of the cost-to-someone of the doing of indus-
tralized business. The general purpose behind this develop-
ment seems to have been to give maximum freedom to ex-
panding industry."'
Since its infancy, this defense has taken on a harsh rigid-
ity in the area of master-servant relationships in this coun-
try. However, in the recent landmark case of Siragusa v.
Swedish Hospital, Washington modified this stringent rule,
becoming one of the first states since the turn of the century
to do so.3 This decision has again brought to light the incon-
sistencies of this rule where the master is negligent in creat-
ing or maintaining a dangerous condition. This study will
make a comparative analysis between the old rule and its
present day modifications. Policy reasons for the alteration
will be discussed, as will North Dakota's law dealing with
the doctrine.
II. BASIS OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Broadly stated, assumption of risk is based on contract,
either express or implied. 4 According to this view an em-
ployee by his very act of entering the service of the em-
ployer assumes the ordinary risks of the employment, or such
1. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943).
2. 373 P.2d 767 (Wrash. 1962).
3. Missouri and North Carolina have adhered to the modified rule
since before the turn of the century. See e. g., Hines v. Continental Bak-
ing Co., 334 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1960); Sims v. Lindsay, 122 N.C. 678, 30 S.E.
19 (1898). Oregon adopted it in Ritter v. Beals, 358 P.2d 1080 (Ore. 1961).
4. Parker v. City of Wichita, 150 Kan. 249, 92 P.2d 86 (1939).
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as usually are incident thereto. It is universally recognized
that an employee injured solely by reason of such risks has
no common-law right of recovery against the employer.5
Usually no distinction is made between ordinary risks inci-
dental to the service and that class of risks generally described
as extraordinary-caused by the master's negligence-when
they are or ought to be known to and appreciated by the ser-
vant.6 Thus, the contract basis has been extended to cover
the assumption of extraordinary risks. It is very generally de-
clared that the consideration for such assumption is the fix-
ing of the compensation with respect to the risks assumed7
Some decisions have held that the doctrine does not rest
on contract, but is based upon the principle expressed by the
maxim, "volenti non fit injuria."8 In other words, he who
consents to an act will not be heard to claim he has been in-
jured by it. These jurisdictions, however, appear to be in the
minority.
III. A DEFENSE WHERE THE EMPLOYER Is NEGLIGENT
Generally, a master has a duty to use ordinary care to
furnish a servant with a reasonably safe place in which to
work and with reasonably safe instrumentalities.9 The em-
ployer will be presumed to know of and to understand such
dangers as ordinarily inhere in the business which he con-
ducts. His failure to use reasonable care constitutes negli-
gence.10
Inasmuch as voluntary action on the part of a servant is
essential to the invocation of the doctrine, it is well settled
that in all cases the basis for charging the servant with the
assumption of the risks normally incident to his employment
5. Lang v. United States Reduction Co., 110 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1940).
6. Gray v. Garrison, 49 Ga. App. 472, 176 S.E. 412 (1934); Stone v. Howe,
92 N.H. 425, 32 A.2d 484 (1943); Leach v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 29 Utah
285, 81 Pac. 90 (1905).
7. Makino v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 155 Ore. 317, 63 P.2d 1082 (1937);
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914).
8. Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Gannon, 40 Colo. 195, 90 Pac. 853 (1907); Oster-
holm v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Co., 40 Mont. 508. 107
Pac. 499 (1910).
9. Cherry v. Hawkins, 137 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1962); Hull v. Davenport,
93 Wash. 16, 159 Pac. 1072 (1916).
10. Symons v. Great Northern Ry., 208 Minn. 240, 293 N.W. 303 (1940);
Wagner v. H. W. Jayne Chemical Co., 147 Pa. 475, 23 Atl. 772 (1892).
11. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Richardson, 116 F.2d 860 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941); Parker v. City of Wichita, 150 Kan. 249, 92
P.2d 86 (1939); Symons v. Great Northern Ry., 208 Minn. 240, 293 N.W. 303
(1940).
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is knowledge by him, either actual or constructive, of such
risks.11 It is his duty to know of and appreciate these, and the
law charges him with the knowledge thereof. 
12
Risks which arise from the negligence of the master are
not ordinary risks incident to the employment, but are "ex-
traordinary.11 3 Usually the servant does not assume these, but
it is a general rule that he may assume them when they are
or ought to be known to, and appreciated by him.14 It is in
this instance that the doctrine becomes harsh and unfair. In
such a case, the defense of assumption of risk may bar re-
covery for injuries attributable to extraordinary dangers
created by the master's own negligence, if the risk causing
the injury is obvious and apparent.15 The employee need not
even be actually aware of the danger for the defense to ap-
ply.16 Therefore, the employee not only is held to assume the
risk of all dangers ordinarily incidental to his work, but also
the extraordinary risks of the employment, although due di-
rectly to the master's negligence. Even though the servant
acted as a reasonably prudent man and was not contribut-
orily negligent, he may still be denied recovery. The master
need only assert that the injured servant was aware of, or
should have known of, the dangerous condition negligently
created. To apply the rule in such a situation "is to affirm
and deny, in the same breath, the employer's duty of care."'' 7
IV. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Since contributory negligence will become involved under
the modified doctrine, it is essential that the distinctions be-
tween assumption of risk and contributory negligence be
pointed out. A Washington court stated:
"While [these defenses] are so closely allied that
12. New York C. & St. L.R.R. v. Boulden, 63 F.2d 917 (7th Cir.), ceart.
denibd, 289 U.S. 753 (1933); Peters v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., 179 Tenn. 509,
167 S.W.2d 973 (1943).
13. Great Northern Ry. v. Nelson, 90 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1937); Brazeale v.
Piedmont Mfg. Co., 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39 (1937).
14. Blaisdell v. Blake, 111 Vt. 123, 11 A.2d 215 (1940).
15. Stone v. Howe, 92 N.H. 425, 32 A.2d 484 (1943); Painter v. Nichols,
118 Vt. 306, 108 A.2d 384 (1954); Cummins v. Default, 18 Wash. 2d 274,
139 P.2d 308 (1943).
16. Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (1958); Wiggins v. E.
Z. Waist Co., 83 Vt. 365, 76 Atl. 36 (1910).
17. Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962).
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it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between
them, they are not synonymous, but are founded on
separate, distinct principles of law. Contributory
negligence involves some breach of duty on the part
of the injured person, or failure on his part to use the
required degree of care for his safety.... [A] ssump-
tion of risk . . . may bar recovery even though the
injured person may be free from contributory negli-
gence."'s
Assumption of risk rests in contract or upon the principle
expressed by the maxim, "volenti non fit injuria." Contribu-
tory negligence rests in tort or an omission of duty.' 9 There-
fore, the denial of recovery on the scope of negligence on the
part of the employee precedes upon a different principle than
a refusal of compensation based on assumption of risk.
V. THE MODIFIED DOCTRINE: THE MISSOURI RULE
It is held without exception, under the modified doctrine,
that a servant never assumes risks occasioned by the care-
lessness or negligence of the master 0 unless that risk is so
open, obvious, and imminent that no person of ordinary pru-
dence would incur it. Under such circumstances, the em-
ployee who continued to work, without using due care, would
be guilty of contributory negligence.2 This was evidenced
in Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital,22 where the court held:
"[I]f the employee's voluntary exposure to the
risk is unreasonable under the circumstances, he will
be barred from recovery because of his contributory
negligence. Knowledge and appreciation of the risk
of injury, on the part of the employee, are properly
important factors which should be given weight in
the determination of the issues of whether the em-
ployer is negligent in maintaining the dangerous con-
dition and whether the employee is contributorily
negligent in exposing himself to it."
18. Walsh v. Vest Coast Coal Mines, 31 Wash. 2d 396, 197 P.2d 233, 240
(1948).
19. St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 Fed. 495 (8th Cir. 1903); Dale
v. Hill-O'Meara Constr. Co., 108 Mo. App. 97, 82 S.W. 1092 (1904).
20. Fischer v. City of Cape Girardeau, 345 Mo. 122, 131 S.W.2d 521 (1939);
George v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 225 Mo. 364, 125 S.W. 196 (1910); Leggett
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 152 N.C. 110, 67 S.E. 249 (1910).
21. Fischer v. City of Cape Girardeau, 345 Mo. 122, 131 S.W.2d 521 (1939);
Maulden v. High Point Pending & Chair Co., 196 N.C. 122, 144 S.E. 557 (1928).
22. 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962).
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The maxim then, under this rule, is, "the moment negli-
gence comes in at the door, the doctrine of assumption of
risk goes out the window. ''2 3 In other words, the master may
not assert, as a defense to an action based upon a breach
of his duty, that the injured employee was aware, or should
have known, of the dangerous condition negligently created
or maintained. 24 The servant assumes only such risks as are
inherent in his work after the master has exercised due care,
and within these confines the ultimate fact question is for
the jury, but under instructions which would preserve these
limitations.
25
In George v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R.,2 6 it was held:
"The servant, when he enters his master's employ,
impliedly agrees with him, for the compensation
named, to assume the risk of usual dangers incident
to the work. But the servant does not assume the risk
of the master's negligence, for a very good reason;
and that is, because it is a fundamental proposition
that it is against public policy for a master to con-
tract against his own negligence. So, too, in the
assumption of risks by a servant it is well to con-
sider a certain assumption by the master; and that is,
that the master impliedly contracts with the ser-
vant that he will exercise ordinary care to protect
such servant from injury by providing a reasonably
safe place for him to work. When these two assump-
tions are considered as proceeding hand in hand, it
will be perceived that the risks assumed by the serv-
ant are those risks alone which remain after the
master has exercised ordinary care."
The reasoning behind this modified doctrine is not new.
It was best described in the words of Labatt, in his treatise
on Master and Servant.
2'
"The acceptance of this principle would not in-
23. Patrum v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 259 Mo. 109, 168 S.W. 622, 624-25
(1914).
24. Williams v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 339 Mo. 594, 98 S.W.2d
651, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 669 (1936); Schaum v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
336 Mo. 228, 78 S.W.2d 439 (1934); Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d"
767 (Wash. 1962).
25. Markley v. Kansas City So. Ry., 338 Mo. 436, 90 Sw.2d 409 (1936);
George v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 225 Mo. 364, 125 S.W. 196 (1910); Siragusa v.
Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962).
26. 225 Mo. 364, 125 S.W. 196, 209 (1910).
27. 3 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT 8 964 (2d ed. 1913).
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volve any very startling changes in the law as we
now have it. It would merely require us to fix the
standard of care incumbent on the master, with a
view to the consideration that, as the implied agree-
ment of the servant is merely that he will use ordi-
nary diligence in the discharge of his functions, it is
a breach of duty in the master to keep his instrumen-
talities in such a condition that ordinary diligence
will not always save the servant from injury. A rule
formulated upon this basis would not make the
master an insurer, nor would it necessarily render
him liable simply for the reason that his appliances
were old and imperfect. It would merely make his lia-
bility dependent upon whether he had or had not
acted unreasonably, and, therefore, negligently, in
holding out inducements to do work which, at certain
conjunctures not unlikely to arise, could not be per-
formed without the exercise of a degree of care
which no fair-minded, considerate person would de-
mand from a servant."
As was earlier stated, in order to charge the servant with
the assumption of risk, the master had only to plead that the
servant was aware of, or should have known of, the dangers
negligently created and maintained by the master. He based
the assumption of risks on contract, either express or implied.
This appears to be a misconception, for the master also im-
plies in his contract that he will furnish and maintain a
reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe appli-
ances. 2 The advocates of the old doctrine appear to overlook
this fact, for when it is included, the servant is left to
assume only ordinary risks. The servant could not possibly
be held to assume those created by the master's negligence in
that case, and to so hold is artifical and harsh. It is not just
or fair to permit a master to escape liability for a failure
to perform his duty, simply because the servant was aware
of, or should have known of, the danger. The servant may
have reasonably elected to expose himself to it. Such an
exposure does not establish prima facie that the servant was
negligent. Whenever there is room for a reasonable differ-
ence of opinion as to whether the servant so appreciated the
danger as to make it reckless to proceed, the question is
one of contributory negligence and is for the jury.2
9
28. George v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 225 Mo. 364, 125 S.W. 196 (1910).
29. Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962).
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VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The doctrine of assumption of risk was originally created
to protect the employer as much as possible from bearing
the burden of human overhead while carrying on an indus-
tralized business. It was meant to give maximum freedom
to expanding industry.3 0 However, these policy reasons no
longer support the doctrine. Realizing this, the Supreme
Court of Washington modified their rule. In Siragusa v.
Swedish Hospital,,' the court had this to say:
"The policy reasons which gave rise to the doct-
rine of assumption of risk in the master-servant area
no longer suffice to support the harsh effects upon
injured employees who seek redress for their em-
ployer's negligence. Public opinion, reflected in
workmen's compensation legislation, has dictated a
change in the underlying concepts of the employer's
responsibility .... No longer can it be said that a judi-
cally-imposed doctrine of assumption of risk is neces-
sary or desirable to protect expanding industry from
being crippled by employer's responsibility for tort-
ious conduct toward their employees .... Such a pre-
sumption has no basis in experience, and is not
founded upon any current social policy."
It is held that an employee who continues working when
he is aware of a negligently created danger assumes the
risk. 2 This brings to light another weakness of the old
doctrine, for it commits the courts to the anomalous position
that actual constraint is something different from legal con-
straint. The frightening consequences of the failure to obtain
work or from the loss of a position will almost always operate
as a very strong coercive influence upon the employee. To
speak of one, whom that fear drives into or detains in a
dangerous employment, as assuming the risk, is a mere trifl-
ing of words.33 To hold that a servant must quit work, or
be held to assume dangers negligently created by the master
by the continuance of such work, even though the servant
is not himself negligent, is absurd. It is an unrealistic and
rigid presumption.
30. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
31. 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962).
32. Gels v. Hodgman, 95 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 1959).
33. 3 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 963 (2d ed. 1913).
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Social and economic notions have changed since the crea-
tion of the doctrine of assumption of risk. Regardless of the
dignity of the doctrine's common-law origin, "it does not
follow that tort-feasors have a vested interest in early cases
which may have afforded some immunity from liability for
fault. '3 4 It is a rather startling position to take, that public
policy requires judges to protect such a doctrine. The judi-
ciary ought not to accord it active encouragement.
VII. NORTH DAKOTA'S VIEW
Section 34-02-03 of the North Dakota Century Code pro-
vides: "An employer, in all cases, shall indemnify his employee
for losses caused by the former's want of ordinary care."
From outward appearances, it looks as if this section imposes
absolute liability upon a negligent employer. However, the
above quoted statute has been on the books for many years
in this state.3 5 In no case has it been held that it imposes
absolute liability.
It is held in this state that if an employer negligently fails
in the performance of his duty, and the employee is injured
thereby while in the exercise of due care, the master will be
liable.36
In Umsted v. Colgate Farmers' Elevator Co.,3 7 the court
quoted with approval the following:
"The doctrine of assumption of risks applies only
to known dangers or those which are so obvious as
to be readily perceived .... It is the duty of a servant
to use reasonable care to inform himself of the haz-
ards to which he may be exposed."
Therefore, in this state, a servant assumes only the ordinary
risks which are obvious, or those which an ordinarily prudent
man, using reasonable diligence, would have discovered. But
the courts have yet to clearly distinguish between assumption
of risk and contributory negligence, where risks are created
by the master's negligence. In such situations, the test of
34. Ritter v. Beals, 358 P.2d 1080, 1087 (Ore. 1961).
35. N.D. Rev. Code § 1131 (1895).
36. Abelstad v. Johnson, 41 N.D. 399, 170 N.W. 619 (1919); Cameron v.
Great Northern Ry., 8 N.D. 124, 77 N.W. 1016 (1898).
37. 18 N.D. 309, 122 N.W. 390, 393 (1909).
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reasonable care on the servant's part is applied.3 8 Therefore,
it is submitted that the "Modified" or "Missouri" rule be fol-
lowed. Assumption of risk should never be the test where
the employer is negligent. In other words, if the servant is
contributorily negligent, he will be denied recovery. To apply
this test and, then say it is assumption of risk, is erroneous,
as assumption of risk and contributory negligence are separ-
ate and distinct defenses. 39 This would be made clearer if
section 34-02-03 were revised to read thus:
"An employer, in all cases, shall indemnify his
employee for losses caused by the former's want of
ordinary care, unless the employee was contributorily
negligent."
VIII. CONCLUSION
It was this writer's purpose to show the general harshness
of the old doctrine of assumption of risk, where the master
was negligent. To deny a servant recovery by merely per-
mitting the employer to plead that the servant was aware of,
or should have known of, the dangerous conditions, is harsh
and unfair. As was shown, the servant may have acted as
a reasonable prudent man in the face of the dangers, and
still have been denied recovery. The better rule would be
the abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk in such
cases. The subjection of the employee's conduct to the test
of contributory negligence as followed in the Missouri doct-
rine is the more just rule.
A word of caution might be in order. Any contemplated
abolition of the defense should be resolved by legislative
action, if possible, as piece-meal judicial destruction of the
doctrine may only breed additional conceptual insecurity.
It is hoped that the recent critical look at the doctrine by
the courts in Washington and Oregon will bring about the
correction of its general harshness and rigidity in this area.
WILLIAM JAY JOHNSON
38. Smith v. Knutson, 76 N.D. 375, 36 N.W.2d 323 (1949); See Wy!des
v. Patterson, 31 N.D. 282, 153 N.W. 630 (1915); Cameron v. Great Northern
Ry., 8 N.D. 124, 77 N.W. 1016 (1898).
39. Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, 31 Wash. 2d 396, 197 P.2d 233
(1948).
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